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Abstract 
The provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 on the impeachment and/or removal 
of public office holders have been invoked with fervor and unusual glee in recent times. In some cases, reasons 
other than the breach of law or gross misconduct have been found to be behind the ouster of elected officers. In 
this regard, several instances of procedural deviations and outright lawlessness have been cited.  
This article examines the position of the Constitution on the removal of public office holders in light of the 
above. This will entail a review of Sections 143 and 188 of the Constitution and the extent to which they have 
been applied in deserving cases. The Sections will also be appraised for both relevance and adequacy within the 
context of what ought to be, in a functional constitutional democracy. 
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1. Introduction 
Elected political officers enjoy and exercise immense power, just as they, in certain cases, enjoy constitutional 
protection and immunity from legal process in the exercise of these powers1. Unfortunately, the latitude afforded 
by the constitution has been used, and wantonly so as a blind for its abuse. Public office holders have trampled 
on law with a touch of impunity, while deploying the machinery of government to perpetuate massive financial 
corruption and cover over patent infraction. 
Our discussion in this paper will be centered around what has now become one of the most engaging issues in 
the constitutional history of Nigeria – the impeachment and/or removal of erring public office holders for 
violation of law or breach of public trust in the discharge of their duties.   
Whereas the tenure of office of the affected officers2 is prescribed and described under the constitution,3 an 
examination of situations under which these may be lawfully truncated is desirable. 
The removal in recent past of at least six state governor’s4 three senate president,5 several speakers of the state 
Houses of Assembly6 and some deputy Governors7 cannot be ascribed to chance. 
The relative ease with which proceedings that eventually culminated in the removal of these office holders were 
conducted has given rise to doubts and questions about this important constitutional process. 
                                                          
  
 
   
1
  Ekengba, O. F. Impeachment proceedings under the 1999 Constitution: A Shield or Sword”?  (unpublished) 2009, p.1. 
2
  We shall limit ourselves to the President, Vice President, Governors and Deputy Governors under  
    Sections 143 and 188. 
3
  These officers are expected, other things being equal to hold office for a period of 4 years each in the  
    first instance.  They are eligible for re- election for another tenure of 4 years after their first term.   
4
  Rasheed Ladoja of Oyo State, Peter Obi of Anambra State, DSP Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa State, Ayodele Fayose of Ekiti 
State(who is now back as Governor), Joshua Dariye of Plateau State and most recently Muritala Nyako of Adamawa State. 
Tanko Almakura of Nasarawa and Adams Oshiomole of Edo state survived the onslaught.  
5
  The Late Evans Enwerem, the Late Dr. Chuba Okadigbo and Adolphus Wabara. 
6
   For example, the Speaker of the House of Ebonyi State and most recently, the Speaker of Ekiti State House of Assembly 
who was removed by a minority of its members.  
7
  For instance Alhaji Abdullahi Argungu, of Kebbi State, Sunday Onyebuchi of Enugu State and Alhaji Mohammed Garba 
Gardi of Bauchi State. 
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When is a person deemed or considered legally impeached? What are and how adequate are the requirements?  
Are the rules in themselves liable to breach or open to abuse?  And most crucially, can appropriate remedies be 
found in cases of infraction? 
These, among other issues will be addressed as we look critically at the provisions of the Constitution on the 
removal of holders of the office of the President, Vice President, Governor and Deputy Governor through the 
constitutional process of impeachment. 
The objective of this endeavour is to appraise Sections 143 and 188 of the Constitution for adequacy and express 
views that will hopefully be useful in the application and invocation of the process. 
 
2. Meaning of Impeachment 
“Impeachment”, like many other words, cannot be defined with precision. A universally accepted meaning has 
therefore not been found for it.   Besides, the Constitution under which it is herein examined, is silent on its 
meaning. 
In the circumstances, an attempt to describe the concept as clearly and as unequivocally as possible, will be 
made at this point. 
To impeach in the linguistic sense, means to accuse a public officer or politician of committing a serious crime, 
especially against the state.1  It connotes a solemn accusation of a great public offence, especially against the 
minister of a crown.2 
According to the Black’s Law Dictionary:3 
 
 
 
 
The impression that is created from the above is that, ‘accusation’ and the commission of a serious offence 
against the state are necessary elements of impeachment.  Also, the mention of the US House of Representatives 
in the definition suggests that impeachment may be narrowed to that chamber of congress.  This, as the facts will 
show, is more than restrictive. 
Whereas the details are still to be examined, these dictionary definitions of impeachment are not totally reflective 
of the content and spirit of sections 143 and 188 of the Constitution, as they deal more with crimes than with 
civil wrong.4 The provisions of the above sections suggest that a misconduct for which the President, Vice 
President, the Governor and Deputy Governor may be removed depend not so much on the commission of a 
heinous crime, but on whether it amounts to a grave violation of the Constitution or whatever the legislature 
considers misconduct.  The term, therefore, may be used to describe the process by which political executives 
are held for misconduct by legislature, resulting in their removal, in some cases. 
In Inakoju & Ors v. Adeleke & Ors5 the Supreme Court suggested that proceedings concerning the misconduct 
contemplated under Sections 143 and 188 of the Constitution may be criminal in nature.  It said, adopting the 
Black Law’s Dictionary approach, that impeachment is:  
                                                          
1
    See Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 6th ed. 2000 p. 621. 
2
   Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary, 6th ed, Sweet and Maxwell, 1976, p. 170, 22 
3
   Abridged Version, 8th ed. p 678  
4
   See Omosehin, K. O. ‘’Critical Evaluation of the Impeachment Provisions of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria”, p.4 
5
   (2007) 4 NWLR pt. 1025 421 SC. 
Impeachment is the act (by legislature) of calling for removal 
from office of a public official accomplished by presenting a 
written charge of the official’s alleged misconduct especially 
the initiation of a proceeding in the US House of 
Representatives against a federal official such as the president 
or a judge. 
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The Court of Appeal while expressed a similar view in Jimoh v. Olawoye,1 stating that: 
 
 
 
 
As has been shown, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, while providing a framework for 
the removal of public office holders, does not define impeachment.  In its place, it employs “removal” under 
Sections 143 and 188. 
While they are frequently used interchangeably in academic commentaries and legal publications, 2 
“Impeachment” and “Removal” are not exactly the same.  Although impeachment appears in Sections 146 and 
191 of the Constitution, it must not be concluded that it stands for the removal of public office holders in the 
manner prescribed by Sections 143 and 188 of the same Constitution. 
As Niki Tobi, JSC(as he then was) noted in Inakoju v. Adeleke3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is accordingly clear that the Impeachment of a public officer is not synonymous with his removal from office.  
It is simply a process or proceeding geared towards the removal of a public office holder from office but which 
may or may not lead to such removal. 
Hence, when 35 senators voted to convict the then American president Andrew Johnson of certain alleged 
offences in 1868, he was impeached but not removed from office.  This was because 35 was a vote short of the 
two – thirds required to remove him from office. 
Appropriately then, impeachment as a process, must follow procedure and would be deemed inchoate until the 
public office holder involved is either removed from office, or is exonerated. 
Since "removal" is what the law intends under Sections 143 and 188 of the Constitution to which this work 
relates, it receives utmost attention, even if impeachment appears to have taken its place in daily discourse.  
 
3. History of Impeachment Proceedings  
The practice and tradition of what is today known as impeachment has been said to predate the country's 
independence.4 It was an integral part of the pre-colonial administration of the old Yoruba kingdom through 
which the Oyo mesi could dethrone an erring king by asking him to open a sacred calabash.  
                                                          
1
   (2001) 10 NWLR, pt. 828,307 at 336. 
2
   Omosehin, K. O. op. cit. p.3 
3
   Supra 
4
   Omosehin, K. O. op. cit. p. 12 
A criminal proceeding against a public officer before a Quasi 
political court instituted by a written accusation called articles 
of impeachment. For example a written Accusation of the 
House of Representative of the United States to the Senate of  
the United States against the President or an officer of the 
United States including Federal judges. 
Impeachment means the act (by legislature) of calling for the 
removal from office of a public official accomplished by 
presenting a written charge of the official alleged misconduct. 
...the word (“Impeachment”) should not be used as a substitute 
for the removal provision of Section 188. We call a spade its 
correct name of spade and not matchete because it is not one. The 
analogy here is that we should call Section 188 procedure One  
for the removal of the Governor, not impeachment. 
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Although the king possessed awesome powers and was addressed as "Kabiyesi" meaning one whose authority 
cannot be questioned and "Iku ekeji orisa" which when translated means "Death, the twin of a god", he would be 
removed if he could no longer be tolerated.  
The presentation of the calabash earlier referred to picture the erosion of trust and the withdrawal of support for 
the erring king.1 
In England, the practice is rooted in antiquity. Impeachment was a judicial action brought by the House of 
Commons, usually for high treason in which the Lords conducted trials and passed sentences only at the request 
of the commons who alone could pardon.2 
The first impeachment in the history of the United Kingdom took place in 1376, when Lord Latimer was 
Impeached. Since then, a few others, for example Warren Hastings in 1788 have been impeached until the 1806 
impeachment of Lord Melville.3  The present parliamentary practice under which the cabinet is responsible for 
individual action of ministers affords a system through which a vote of no confidence could be passed on an 
entire cabinet for certain reasons.  
At independence, the parliamentary system became operative in Nigeria. It was a system that eased the prime 
minister and his cabinet out of office once it was passed. It was not targeted at any single individual, as is the 
case under the presidential system.  
After the introduction of the presidential system under the constitution, attention shifted to gross misconduct as 
the grounds on which an erring individual, not a group could be removed. Collective responsibility gave way to 
individual responsibility so that everyone without the cover of a group could be held responsible, even liable, for 
any act done or omission made in their capacity as public office holders.  
The Nigerian state recorded the first case of impeachment on 23 June 1981, when the then Governor of Kaduna 
State, Alhaji Balarabe Musa and his deputy were removed from their offices through the process of impeachment 
by the House of Assembly.  
Since then, many more public office holders have been removed from office. Governors have particularly been 
made to face charges of corruption and abuse of office that eventually triggered the process of their removal.  
An overview of the constitutional provisions under which public office holders may be removed will next be 
considered. It is intended to reveal the entire gamut of steps prescribed as necessary for impeachment and 
ultimate removal of officers within the purview of the law and due process.  
 
4. Overview of Impeachment Proceedings Under Sections 143 and 188 of The 1999 Constitution 
The constitutional provisions for the removal of persons elected to hold and exercise executive powers as 
contained in Section 5 of the Constitution are found in Sections 143 and 188 of the Constitution.  
Both Sections consist of 11 subsections outlining the various steps that must be taken in the removal of the 
named officers.  
Generally, it is required under the Sections that whenever a notice of any allegation in writing signed by not less 
than one third of the members of the legislature involved is presented to the President of the Senate or the 
Speaker of the House of Assembly as the case may be, that the holder of the office is guilty of gross misconduct 
in the performance of the functions of his office, the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of 
Assembly shall within seven days of the receipt of the notice cause a copy thereof to be served on the holder of 
the office and on each member of the legislature.  
                                                          
1
   Ibid. 
2
   Sanusi, O. I.  “Appraisal of the Impeachment Provision of the Constitution of the Federal Republic   of Nigeria 
(Unpublished) p.5  
3
   The Impeachment provision of the American Constitution was put to the test for the first time when an attempt was made 
to remove Andrew Johnson the then president of the United States in 1968. 
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If the holder of the office makes any statement in reply to the allegation, the President of the Senate or the 
Speaker of the House of Assembly shall also cause that to be served on members of the house.1  
According to Sections 143(3) and 188(3), each House of the National Assembly or the State House of Assembly 
involved, shall, by motion, but without debate, resolve whether or not the allegation leveled against the office 
holder shall be investigated.  
A motion of the legislature that the allegation be investigated shall not be declared as having been passed, unless 
it is supported by votes of not less than two - thirds majority of all members of the concerned legislature.2  
If the motion to investigate the concerned office holder is passed, then the Chief Justice of Nigeria or the Chief 
Judge of the State shall at the request of the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Assembly of 
the State, appoint a panel of seven persons to investigate the allegation within seven days. Such persons shall, in 
the opinion of the Chief Justice of Nigeria or the Chief Judge, be persons of unquestionable integrity who are 
neither members of any public service, legislative house or political party.  
They are to be unattached and completely disconnected from commitments that membership of any of the named 
institutions can bring.  
The panel is allowed a period of three months to report its findings to the National Assembly or the House of 
Assembly as the case may be. 
Where the panel reports that the allegation has not been proved, no further proceedings shall be taken in respect 
of the matter and it would "die" naturally.3  If however the allegation is proved, then, the National Assembly or 
the appropriate state House of Assembly, shall within 14 days, consider the report of the panel which were 
adopted, will cause the removal of the office holder from his office from the date of the adoption.4 
There is an opportunity in all of this for the officer whose conduct is being investigated to defend himself, either 
in person or through a legal practitioner.5  
However, no proceeding or determination of the panel, the National Assembly or the House of Assembly shall 
be referred to or entertained in any Court. No issue or any matter relating thereto shall be made a question of 
litigation. 6 Once the panel reports its findings, the matter ends.7 
 
5. Legal Analysis of the Impeachment Process  
As we noted earlier, a number of public office holders especially state chief executives, have been removed 
supposedly for gross-misconduct under the impeachment process. “Gross misconduct” in this case, means a 
grave violation or breach of the provisions of the Constitution or a misconduct of such nature as amounts in the 
opinion of the National Assembly or State House of Assembly, to be gross misconduct.  
Recent events in Nigeria have given the spotlight to Sections 143 and 188 of the Constitution and have afforded 
an insight into what the impeachment process looks like in practice.   
A case in point was the purported removal of the one-time governor of Oyo State, Rasheed Ladoja for what 
many saw and still see as disloyalty to the acclaimed god father of Ibadan politics, the late Alhaji Lamidi 
Adedibu.  
                                                          
1
   Sections 143(2) and 188(2) 
2
   Sections 143(4) and 188(4) 
3
    See Sections 143(8) and 188(8) 
4
    Sections 143(9) and 188(9) 
5
    Section 143(6) and 188(6) 
6
    Sections 143(10) and 188 (10) 
7
    The holder of any of the offices under Sections 143 and 188 shall be removed only for gross misconduct. 
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The Oyo state House of Assembly initiated proceeding against the Governor under Section 188 of the 
Constitution and eventually proclaimed the impeachment of the governor, removing him from office. His 
counterpart in Anambra State, Mr. Peter Obi of APGA was removed from office on account of the frosty 
relationship that existed between him and the PDP dominated legislature. That House of Assembly wasted little 
time in supervising his removal. 1 
DSP Alamieyeseigha lost his seat as governor of Bayelsa State, following the pressure the Federal Government 
mounted on the State's House of Assembly.2 
The governor was eventually removed purportedly In a Lagos Hotel by members of the State's legislature. The 
process for the removal of Ayodele Fayose by the Ekiti state House of Assembly from office in his first coming 
as governor actually took place long after the governor had vanished from sight. His presence was dispensed 
with, even if it was vital to hearing.  
As for Joshua Dariye, the then governor of Plateau State, only a handful - six members of the State's House of 
Assembly to be precise saw to his "removal". Muritala Nyako got the boot and was removed from office as soon 
as he crossed from the Peoples’ Democratic Party to the All Progressives Congress. The allegation in all of these 
cases was gross misconduct on the part of the governors. Misconduct is said to be gross when it amounts to a 
grave violation or breach of the Constitution or a misconduct of such a nature as to amount in the opinion of the 
legislature to gross misconduct.  
The question though, is - what is grossly and legally wrong in being disloyal to a' self-acclaimed god father? 
How is membership of an unpopular political party a grave violation of the Constitution?  
What breach of the Constitution can be greater than the impeachment of a governor in absentia or by a number 
less than that constitutionally prescribed?  
These are questions that are answerable only in the light of impeachments conducted on the strength of 
allegation of gross misconduct.  
Since the reasons advanced for the removal of the named governors had little to do with misconduct, the Courts 
had no problems proclaiming their unconstitutionality.  
Commenting on what is legally considered to be gross misconduct, Niki Tobi, JSC(as he then was) observed in 
Inakoju v. Adeleke3 that: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
His lordship went further to state that:  
By definition, it is not every violation or breach of the consti- 
tution that can lead to the removal of a Governor or Deputy 
Governor. Only a grave violation or breach of the constitute- 
ion can lead to the removal of a Governor or Deputy Governor. 
"Grave" in the context does not mean excavation in earth in 
                                                          
1
 Peter Obi was eventually reinstated as governor and saw out his term. 
2
 Members of the House were reportedly threatened with prosecution by the EFCC if they refused to remove the governor 
3
 Supra 
The word "gross" in the subsection does not bear its meaning of 
aggregate income. It rather means generally in the context, 
atrocious, colossal, deplorable, disgusting, dreadful, enormous, 
gigantic, grave, heinous, outrageous, odious, and shocking. All 
these words express some extreme negative conduct. Therefore, 
a misconduct which is the opposite of the above cannot 
constitute gross misconduct. Whether a conduct is gross or not 
will depend on the matter as exposed by the facts. It cannot be 
determined in vacuo or in a vacuum but in relation to the .facts 
of the case and the law policing the facts. 
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which a dead body is buried, rather it means in my view, seri- 
ous substantial, and weighty.1 
 
In the words of professor Nwabueze:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is clear then that conduct is gross only when it is serious enough to constitute a grave violation of the 
Constitution or a breach of any of its provisions. It cannot be when the situation is different. If there was any 
doubt as to the meaning of gross misconduct under the aforementioned Section of the Constitution, the 
comprehensive exposition in Inakoju v. Adeleke has taken that away.  
However, the discretion to determine what amounts to gross violation of the Constitution under Sections 143 and 
188 is that of the National Assembly and the State House of Assembly respectively. Whereas the institutions 
within every political system are all subject to the jurisdiction of the court, they (the courts) must never take over 
the function of the legislature in this regard. As Irvin of Lairg noted:2 
In exercising their powers of judicial review, the judges should never give grounds for the public to believe that 
they intend to reverse government policies which they dislike. That is why I regard as unwise observations of the 
Bench by eminent judges that the courts have reacted to the increase in the powers claimed by government by 
being more active themselves and adding for good measure that this has become all the more important at time 
of one party government. It suggests to ordinary people the judicial - invasion of the legislature's tuff.  
Pats - Acholonu, JCA (as he then was) opined in Balarabe Musa v. Auta Hamzat3 that:   
 
 
 
 
What this implies is that the prerogative of determining what gross misconduct is the legislature's. The court 
cannot and should not interfere in the matter.  
The legislature on the other hand is obliged to exercise its power under Sections 143(11) and 188 (11) in 
accordance with the law. This is because impeachment as a process, could be used to achieve objectives not 
contemplated by the Constitution.  
                                                          
1
 Examples of what the Supreme Court held to be grave violation of the Constitution include interference     in 
the functions of other arms of government, abuse of fiscal provision of the Constitution, disregard for chapter 
four of the Constitution, instigation of military rule, grave misconduct include refusal to perform Constitutional, 
function, Corruption, abuse of power, certificate forgery, sexual harassment etc 
2
 See Hansard of the House of Lords 5 June 1996, p. 1255 
3
   (1982) 3 NCLR, 229 
The act or omission alleged must be proved to be a misconduct 
in an objective, legal sense before the discretion of the Assembly 
to 'say whether it amounted to gross misconduct  can' come into 
play. Misconduct in the legal sense can connote an "unlawful 
behaviour by a public officer in relation to the duties of his 
office willful in' character such as "acts which he has no right to 
perform, acts performed improperly and failure to act in the face 
of an affirmative duty to act. 
 
The courts should not attempt to assume for itself power it is 
never given by the constitution to brazenly enter into the miasma 
of the political cauldron and have itself bloodied and thereby 
losing respect in its quest to play the legendary don quizotic te 
de la mandie. 
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 As Onnoghen JSC noted in A-G v. Atiku Abubakar1  
 
 
 
 Karibi - Whyte, JSC (as he then was) also observed2 that:  
 
 
  
 
Onagoruwa expressed the view that:  
Impeachments are heavy - handed and' clumsy instruments of 
penalizing serious political delinquencies. Very few convictions 
have been recorded up to date, primarily because a great deal of 
political maneuvering is always involved3.  
 
The Supreme Court of Malaysia in Mustapha v. Mohammed & Anor4  has also held that:  
 
 
 
Clearly then, the impeachment process can be used to destroy or penalize victims for reasons other than those 
permitted by law.  
Politicking as it is now known, is almost always at the root of such misuse and abuse. Accordingly, public office 
holders have been removed without clear evidence of gross misconduct.  
A serious legislature would not subscribe to this practice. The National Assembly and/or the State House of 
Assembly must learn to insist on loyalty, morality and due process whenever they are called upon to determine 
that which in their opinion, is a grave violation of the constitution, amounting in form to gross misconduct. 
 
6. Service of Notice of Allegation of Gross Misconduct  
The service of a notice outlining details of the alleged misconduct on the part of a public office holder is a sine 
qua non to impeachment proceedings under the Constitution. Such notice must be signed by at least one third of 
the members of the legislature involved and must be served within seven days of its receipt by the President of 
Senate or the Speaker of the House of Assembly if a State Governor or his Deputy is involved.  
                                                          
1
   (2007) 10 NWLR, Pt 104, 75 
2
   See Karibi – Whyte A. G. “Impeachment of Public Officers under the 1999 Constitution” (2000) 3 MILB 999, 103 
3
 Onagoruwa, O. “Law and Contemporary Nigeria: Reflections. Inspired Communications Ltd, Lagos 2004, p. 470 
4
 1987 LRC, 16 
Impeachment is a strong weapon in the hands of the National 
Assembly. It is a political solution to political problems that may 
arise in the presidency either in the discharge of the 
constitutional functions or conduct of the personality in involved. 
Impeachment is a potent political weapon in the arsenal of the 
political party or in control of the legislature to impose 
sanctions on any erring public officer. It is a demonstration that 
no person is above the law, and that every public officer is 
accountable under the constitution. 
As to whether the issues (i.e. the purported removal of the prime 
minister by the head of state) are political in nature, one would 
be naive not to regard them as partly political ... 
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The fact that the service of notice must be made within seven days shows that the date of the presentation of the 
notice to the legislative houses is relevant in computing the date on which the notice was served on the holder of 
the office to determine whether the seven day deadline set by the Constitution, has been complied with.1 
Any notice not served before the expiration of the period of seven days for the purpose of initiating proceedings 
for the removal of the holder of the office concerned, is inoperative and nugatory.  
Any subsequent removal purportedly carried out on the strength of such notice however well conducted will not 
stand. The result will be same when proceedings for the removal of the office holder are done without notice of 
allegation of gross misconduct against him.  
An observation to this effect was made by Bulkachuwa, JCA in Diaplong v. Dariye2  that: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is where the tragedy in the exercise of legislative powers that is, the provision of section 188 (2) 
applicable in the case under review is as clear as it can be. The issue is why was the holder of the office 
in question not served? Where was the notice alleging gross misconduct if one existed? Was it 
destroyed and probably misplaced, or did the legislature in its rush to remove the governor from office 
forget to effect service as required by law? Whatever the reason, the House of Assembly ought not to 
have carried on without complying with the law in exercising its authority.3 It shows again that reasons 
other than those lawfully specified are sometimes brought to bear on this important aspect of the 
constitutional process.  
 
Similarly, the issue of the nature of service is relevant. Although the Constitution is silent on the 
question of whether or not personal service is the only means of service allowed, the Courts appear to 
be unanimously in support of personal service on the holder of the office. In this regard, the court in 
Balonwu v Obi4 condemned the publication of the notice of allegations of gross misconduct in the 
newspapers, holding that any notice not personally served cannot support the valid removal of the 
governor. 
This view on personal service, in a way, represents the ideal, even if it is sometimes far from 
practicable. While it is admitted that the constitutional requirement of service is sacrosanct to the entire 
removal process, the near impossibility of personal service should not be entirely overlooked. In 
deserving circumstances, especially where the alleged executive head is avoiding personal service and 
he is doing his bit to frustrate all attempts to serve him personally,5 service by substituted means may 
be considered. 
Failure to recognize the position for what it is, is to countenance the possible altercation that may occur 
between the legislature and the executive over the service of notice. This is more so, where the public 
                                                          
1
   Omosehin, K. O.; op. cit. 22 
2
   (2007) 8 NWLR, Pt 1036, 239 
3
    See Balonwu v. Obi (2003) 5 NWLR, Pt 102, 188 
4
   Supra 
5
   Omosehin, K. O. op. cit. p. 25 
The requirement of subsection (2) that whenever a notice of allegation 
of gross misconduct signed by not less than one third of the members 
of the House against a Governor is presented to the speaker of the 
House of Assembly of a state, he shall within seven days of the receipt 
of such notice cause a copy to be served on the Governor and on each 
member of the house '," there is in effect nothing documentary to show 
that he was so served, the impeachment of a serving Governor is a 
weighty matter, and the service of the notice is fundamental to the 
whole process, one would expect the defendant to keep records of the 
service of the notice they said was effected on the plaintiff not a mere 
denial in an affidavit to his averment that he has not been served…  
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office holder is sure that nothing less than personal service on him, would be valid in law to support his 
removal and that he only needs to avoid service for seven days to lay everything relating to the attempt 
to remove him from office to rest. 
If therefore the notice of allegation of gross misconduct cannot be served within seven days, as 
prescribed by the Constitution, it becomes a dead document, completely devoid of content. This is 
irrespective of whether an attempt was made to effect personal service or not. The problem is that this 
aspect of the impeachment process is open to abuse. Since nothing apart from a personal sense of 
responsibility compels a public office holder to make himself available, he might decide to frustrate 
service. What if he travels for medical checkup within the time? What if he proceeds on leave or just 
refuses to see the process server? With the aura of demigods with which our leaders carry themselves, it 
is likely that protocol and security will be considered more important than the service of notice alleging 
misconduct of a chief executive. It is sometimes the reason behind the permanent war between the 
legislature and the executive.  
7. The Investigating Panel of Inquiry 
Power is vested in the Chief Justice of Nigeria or the Chief Judge of a State to appoint a Panel of 
Inquiry consisting of seven persons under Sections 143 (5) and 188 (5) of the Constitution at the 
request of either the Senate President, or the Speaker of the House of Assembly.  
The seven persons to be appointed by the Chief Justice of Nigeria or the Chief Judge must, in his 
opinion, be persons of unquestionable integrity, not being members of any public service, legislative 
house or political party. The discretion is entirely that of the Chief Justice or Judge to appoint these 
ones as he is not bound to confer with the Senate President or the Speaker of the House of Assembly to 
perform this function.  
The power must be exercised fairly, validly and without fear or favour. For example, where there is 
evidence that a member of the panel is an employee of the State, the discretion as to his appointment 
cannot be said to be validly exercised. It has been said that a person who has publicly commented on 
the conduct of the public office holder and has strongly condemned same cannot rightly be a member 
of the panel of inquiry. To empanel such a person is to give him a long awaited opportunity to 
articulate his detestation, and to vent his anger on the accused person who he has already condemned in 
his mind.1 These are safeguards that have their root in the Constitution. What is not clear however is 
the position of the law when the spouse or any other close relation of a member of the investigating 
panel is a card carrying member of a political party. If the wife or husband of a member were to be 
allowed to belong actively to a political party; then the possibility of abuse and prejudice which the 
Constitution seeks to prevent, exists. 
How can cases of favoritism and abuse be entirely avoided when a panelists' wife or sibling is a 
member of a political party? If there is the possibility of bias where a member of the panel is a member 
of a political party, there is no reason why such bias will not taint judgment where the wife or husband 
is the member of the political party given the great effect and influence of conjugal relations. 
Concerning the personal attributes of members of the investigating panel, the Constitution sets a very 
high standard. Those to be appointed must be persons of unquestionable integrity. They must be 
persons unblemished, untainted and undefiled in character. They must be transparently honest, 
trustworthy and above board. In Inakoju v. Adeleke2, the Supreme Court held that: 
                                                          
1
   Ibid 
2
 Supra 
A person who believes in vengeance or vendetta is not one of 
unquestionable character. An overzealous human being with 
speculative, extremities, or idealisms, will not be a person of 
unquestionable integrity because some of his speculative or 
extremities or idealisms may turn out to be utopian and will be a bad 
way of judging a Governor in a realistic way is the running of the 
state. 
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The question to ask is where can such persons be found? Is there a man or a woman whose integrity 
cannot be questioned? Is the Chief Justice of Nigeria or the Chief Judge of a State capable on their own 
to determine the question? The truth is that not many among those appointed to serve on investigating 
panels have proved to be persons of integrity in the light of the Constitution. Some in fact have been a 
little more than puppets in the hands of their appointors even when the stakes are high. 
 
More worrisome is the position of the Chief Justice of Nigeria or the Chief Judge of a State in the 
appointment and Constitution of the investigating panel. Under our laws, the judiciary is a branch or 
organ of government. Those who occupy the exalted offices of the Chief Justice of Nigeria or the Chief 
Judge of the State are persons appointed by the President and State Governors respectively. They are 
heads of their various Courts courtesy of their appointors. How dispassionate then can these judges be 
when called upon to play a role in the removal of the President or State Governor? Will they have the 
courage to do the needful particularly when they are not expected to bite the finger from which they 
feed?  
The anomaly is there to see. The present constitutional arrangement offers little safeguard against 
compromise. 
 
8. Jurisdiction of The Court 
Sections 143 (10) and 188(10) of the Constitution expressly ousts the jurisdiction of the courts to 
entertain matters dealing with or relating to the impeachment of public office holders. The exact letters 
of the law are: 
 
 
 
A public office holder be he the President, Vice president, Governor or Deputy Governor who is 
removed from office is by the above precluded from instituting proceedings in a Court of Law against 
the determination of either the panel or the concerned legislature. This is irrespective of whether he has 
a genuine cause for complaint or not. 
What this implies is that a public office holder who is removed under the provisions of Sections 143 
and 188 of the 1999 Constitution will not, should not and must not be heard by the Court even when 
aggrieved. The right of access to Court to which every citizen of Nigeria is entitled is effectively 
curtailed and denied.  
The judiciary is itself prevented from performing its institutional obligation of ensuring strict 
compliance with the law and granting remedy to the aggrieved.1 
 
According to Lindley, MR. in Roberts v. G. W. District council2: 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 The position is directly contrary to the maxim ‘ubi jus ibi remedium that is where there is a right, there is a remedy 
2
 (1899) L.R.Z. Ch.D, 614 
I am aware of no duty of the court which is more important to enforce 
than its power of keeping public officials and public bodies within their 
rights. The moment public bodies exceed their rights, they do so to the 
injury and oppression of private individuals, and those persons are 
entitled to be protected from injury arising from such operations of 
public bodies. 
No proceedings or determination of the panel or of the National 
Assembly. (or the House of Assembly) or my matter relating thereto 
shall be entertained or questioned in any court. 
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Akaahs, JCA in Adeleke v. Oyo State House of Assembly1 similarly observed that: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once the court has jurisdiction conferred by law in a matter, there is no reason why it should not 
exercise it. It is even beyond dispute that the court has jurisdiction to determine whether it has 
jurisdiction in any matter or suit. It is therefore curious that the organic law of the land - the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 has proceeded to oust the jurisdiction of the 
Courts established there under in any and every matter relating to impeachment. How will the 
oppressed find succour if he feels justly cheated? Why will the Courts be invited to fold their arms and 
do nothing in the face of injustice?  
According to Niki Tobi, JSC in Attorney-General, Abia State v. Attorney-General of the Federation2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Galadima, JCA(as he then was) in Alamieyeseigha v. Igoniwarie (N0.23 also said that:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
As Uwaifo, JCA (as he then was) noted, 4  once an illegality is allowed to go unchallenged by 
                                                          
1
 Supra 
2
 (2006) 16 NWLR, Pt 1005, 265, 382 
3
 (2007) 7 NWLR, Pt 1034, 534. 
4
 See Bamidele v Commissioner for Local Government (1994) 2 NWLR, Pt. 328, 568, 586 
A close scrutiny of section 188 of the 1999 Constitution reveals that the 
procedure for impeachment of the Governor or his Deputy is not 
purely a legislative function since the chief judge of a state also has a 
role to play. In this regard therefore, I am of the considered view that 
where the action of the state House of Assembly in initiating 
impeachment proceedings is being questioned or the chief judge in 
consulting the panel to probe allegations of gross misconduct, the 
courts are entitled to ascertain whether those who voted for 
investigation to be carried out reached the two-thirds of the 
membership of the House. In the same vein the exercise of discretion 
by the chief judge of empanelling the 7 members if challenged can be 
looked into by the court. The court should also have power to ascertain 
if two - thirds of the members voted to remove the incumbent 
Governor. 
Where the National Assembly qua legislature moves from the 
constitutional purview of Section 4(2) of the Constitution or vice versa 
as it relates to the House of Assembly of a State in respect of Section 
4(7) and issue or question of constitutionality…arises, and Court of 
Law in the exercise of their judicial powers, when asked by a party, 
will move in to stop any excess in exercise of legislative power… this is 
what I am doing and Section 6 of the Constitution is my authority for 
doing so… As a judge, I am hired to interpret the laws of this country 
which includes the constitution …where there is infraction of the law, I 
have a constitutional duty to say so and I must say so. 
They cannot be totally ignored in impeachment proceedings. No court 
of law can close its eyes to the infringement of the constitution. The 
court is the primary custodian of the constitution. It must guard 
jealously all the provisions of the constitution. If any arm of 
government ... acts un constitutionally, the court his inherent power 
under section 6(6) of the 1999 constitution to intervene. 
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whosoever is affected, more serious infractions will soon be committed. In due course, the Constitution 
will be rendered irrelevant and that will mean a slide into authoritarianism. All this can come about just 
because the Law and the Constitution were not observed and the non-observance was connived at or 
acquiesced in, and the Court in a competent action did nothing about it.  
 
That is what it will mean if we continue to have a Law that forbids or disallows proceedings against the 
legislature or a panel of inquiry in an impeachment proceeding. The Nation cannot afford to muzzle its 
Courts for a moment or for any reason. It is noteworthy and most gratifying that on the 21st of 
November 2014, the Supreme Court in recognition of the need to uphold justice and fair play, 
intervened and nullified the process that led to the removal of the Deputy Governor of Taraba State, 
Sani Abubakar Danladi from office. In a unanimous judgment, it declared the process through which 
Danladi was impeached unconstitutional and sacked Garba Umar who took his place on that score. It is 
hoped that the lead provided by the Apex Court will embolden our courts to rise to the occasion and do 
justice in all deserving cases.    
 
9. Conclusion  
The several requirements for the removal of a public office holder have been considered herein within 
the context of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. The legal framework for 
bringing a charge of gross misconduct against the President, Vice president, Governor and Deputy 
Governor has also been analyzed in the light of what is permissible.  
We have given attention to the various functionaries involved in the impeachment process, the 
constitutional obligation they have to see it through, as well as the inveterate problems that have been 
and are likely to be encountered if the law remains as it is.  
Our expectation in all of these is that steps will be taken at the level of government to enhance the 
process and transform impeachment into a proper instrument of control.  
We no longer wish to hear about proceedings taking place at midnight, in private homes, hotel rooms, 
and other strange enclosures. Accordingly, the time is due for the constitution to clearly state the place 
of meeting for the removal of public office holders. 
The impeachment of anyone charged with a public duty is a serious business that must not be 
trivialized or taken with levity. As has been said: 
 
Impeachment is not an inquest of office, a political process for tur- 
ning out a president whom a majority of the House and two thirds 
of the senate simply cannot abide. It is certainly not, nor was it ever 
intended to be an extraordinary device for registering a vote of no 
confidence.1 
 
Appropriately then, public office holders should be removed from office only when their conduct is 
truly reprehensible and blameworthy. Allegations that are purely political and those motivated by 
malice must be discountenanced, as they have no place in the process. 
 
On the other hand, misfits that have been found to be involved in gross misconduct and in constant 
breach of the constitution must be made to feel the impeachment provisions by being eased out of the 
exalted offices of the President, Vice President, Governor, and Deputy Governor in the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria. That, in every case, should be after the prescriptions set out in Sections 143 and 
188 of the Constitution have been scrupulously followed.  
 
                                                          
1
 See Rossiter, C “The American Presidency” 1960, pp.52-3. 
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